

Comparative Analysis of National Bureaucracies*

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In an earlier paper, when discussing the problems of variable political power and productivity of bureaucracies, we sought to show the difficulties, at the empirical as well as at the conceptual level, of handling the comparison of bureaucratic systems in a cross-national way. Regarding the empirical difficulties, our main conclusion was that a series of assumptions of a very debatable nature had to be made if cross-national statistical data are to be used. We should start, we said, with the assumption that structural and permanent characteristics of social systems, as extra-bureaucratic variables, have specific bearing upon the variations of our dependent variables (political power, productivity, organizational authority and form, behavior and other unintended functions of public bureaucracies). The alternative to this approach is that suggested by Bendix: to give up thinking in terms of variables, and look for the specific historical social settings where the different characteristics of bureaucracies arise. This would lead to a more historiographic and qualitative handling of empirical materials, with a very little output of general propositions.

The conceptual problems we pointed out were the pluridimensionality of concepts, its dependence regarding ideological preferences, and the difficulties of defining our unit of analysis--the difficulties of "catching the animal." We said that the number of hypotheses we can derive from the literature is practically endless, and the main problem is how to bring them together in coherent theoretical framework.

The aim of this paper is to experiment with a framework of this kind, which could integrate the large amount of hypotheses and theories that appeared in the

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reading and discussion of the literature. The possibilities of this integration and the internal consistency of the scheme will indicate how well we have succeeded in our attempt. The paper will be structured around the basic four questions of Professor Ilchman's seminar.

I. - Defining the unit of analysis, bureaucracy

There are two main possibilities for the definition of bureaucracy, the functional and the structural approach. The first consists of defining a function that is supposed to be performed in all societies, and on saying that we call "bureaucracy" the institution that performs this function. The second is to pick one specific and observable social structure, or institution, and look for its presence or absence, varying characteristics and functions between and within societies. The Weberian ideal type, as far as it has the characteristics of a Platonic concept, which has to be described in its details, falls within the structural alternative.

According to the functional definition, public bureaucracy is the institution in charge of the enforcement of rights and duties in the society, through authoritative allocation. The advantage of this definition is that we can use it without being bound to any particular feature of the bureaucratic institution of a specific context. We could proceed with public bureaucracies as Almond does with other political institutions: for instance, the rule-making function is performed by the Congress in the U.S.A., the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R., the P.R.I. in Mexico, and the Army in Argentina. Accordingly, these are the structures we should deal with if we are interested in studying the legislative process in a cross-national way. The weakness of this approach is that it is very difficult to define a set of functions that would be free of ethnocentrism, and the consequence could be to impose the existence of non-existent institutions and functions to societies that are structured in a way that is completely distinct from the implicit modern Western model. Regarding the public bureaucracies, one consequence of the functional approach is that it never allows us to ask the question about the emergence of this

institution. Actually, from a functional standpoint, bureaucracy, as an allocator of power decisions, is always present in all societies, and we can study its manifestations and variations, but never its development and decline. The only thing we have are changes in its attributes: power, weight, productivity, patterns of organization and authority, and so on. Strictly speaking, the functional definition does not allow us to study phenomena of bureaucratic power, bureaucratic interest aggregation and coordination or other functions that fall within another functional category than "allocation of power."

A very different approach is that of Eisenstadt. He speaks on "bureaucratic systems," which means that there are systems that are not bureaucratic. For him, bureaucratic systems are those where there is autonomy and distinctiveness of the political system, and a special organization for the mobilization of the major types of facilities. This situation leads to the existence of a political and ruling group which is not identical with any given, ascriptive social group. When this specific group exists, we are able to speak of a "bureaucratic system." The bureaucratic systems are very different from the primitive and feudal ones, and Eisenstadt lists six conditions that lead to the emergence of bureaucratic systems. Besides, he works with the idea of "degrees of bureaucrativeness," using as its maximum value Weber's ideal type: so, a system is more bureaucratic the more there is a distinctiveness of the political hierarchy, specific administrative and political organizations, regulation of the bureaucratic apparatus by specific rules and non-patrimonial remuneration.

We shall use Eisenstadt's definition in the following, which means that we will be dealing with a universe of societies which is defined by the existence of bureaucratic institutions in each one of them. We will drop the idea of "degrees of bureaucrativeness," and look for the variations according to the basic four questions of the seminar.

II. - Four questions about public bureaucracies

The discussion of the variable power, productivity, organization forms and authority and behavioral patterns of public bureaucracies and bureaucrats is always disturbed by the different meanings each of these variables may have. For instance, political power, which is essentially an interaction concept, can be seen from the perspective of who has it (the state, the bureaucratic strata, the bureaucratic institution, or the bureaucrat) and from the perspective of regarding whom this power is exercised. This gives us sixteen possibilities, and similar numbers of types of productivity, organizational authority, patterns of behavior, etc., can be derived without much difficulties. It is clear that some principle of organization is necessary for reducing all these possibilities.

Since Comparative Bureaucracies, as a new sub-discipline, still does not have its scientific paradigm, the choice of this principle of organization is a matter of personal concern which is, at last analysis, impossible to be rationally justified. We must start with a value statement, and our value statement is the ideal of a fully developed, pluralist and egalitarian society. "Development" stands here for welfare, as it is defined by the contemporary welfare states; "pluralist" stands for the distribution of power among the society, and not concentrated in a small group or sector; and "egalitarian" is a concept of non-ascriptive barriers and individual rights

Our interest in comparing bureaucracies is a derivation of these values, and our general question can be phrased this way: how do we explain differential bureaucratic contribution to this ideal state, between and within political systems? The specification of this general question gives rise to the empirical and theoretical enquiry.

The question of power has a direct bearing on our values. We will be interested in how bureaucracy can reduce pluralism and individual freedom, and also in the differential power of the bureaucracies to bring development, if the productivity is constant. The question about productivity is, directly, a question of development, and we will be interested in the productivity of goods that have to do with it.

Since we are not interested in all the possibilities of variations of the bureaucratic institutions, but only in those that are related to our values, we will deal with problems of organizational forms, authority and patterns of behavior only as far as they can have some impact on these values. Thus these variables will be considered as independent or intervenient ones regarding power and productivity.

So much for conceptual bulldozing, and let us start.

XII. - Variable Political Power

Weber defines power as "the chance of a man or a group of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (Weber, p. 180). Political power is a power relation that is backed by the use of force as ultima ratio. Another component of the concept of political power is that the appeal to force tends to be legitimized, when the power relationship stabilizes.

If we think in terms of resources, we can say that the exercise of political power consists in an authoritative allocation of scarce values in the society. But power itself is a scarce value, and as a matter of fact the most important one, since it determines the allocation of the others. The allocation of political power in society depends on two factors, basically: the actual or potential chance of using force, and the culturally accepted patterns of leadership and compliance. Accordingly, we will say that a political system is absolutist when all the political power is concentrated in the hands of the government, and there is no other more or less organized group that can retain part of it. When this distribution of power exists, we will say that we have a pluralist political system. When, in a society, there is no political power distributed among the citizens, we will speak of a totalitarian system; when there is, for the lack of a better word ("personalist?" "individualist?" "privatist?"), we will call it an egalitarian system.

These possibilities refer to a zero-sum game situation, where a given amount of power is differentially shared by government, other political groups and citizens. When this situation is stable, the power system guarantees the maintenance of the distribution pattern; when the equilibrium is dynamic, the power sources operate an authoritative settling of claims. When the equilibrium is disrupted, it is a situation of redistribution of resources. Finally, non-zero-sum game situations exist where the amount of resources is increasing, and the power structure regulates both the creation and the distribution of these resources.

Bureaucracy can contribute to absolutism mainly in two different ways. The first is when bureaucracy is an instrument of absolutism in the hands of the government. The second is when the bureaucracy, as an institution or as a group, exercises absolute power by itself. The proposition, which is a logical one, is that, for a given amount of governmental absolutism, the power of the bureaucracy is inversely related to the power of the non-bureaucratic sectors of the government, mainly the executive.

So, Wittfogel and Rosenberg point to very dissimilar situations. Both types of societies, the "agrarian despotism" and Prussia, are absolute systems, but in the former the power of the bureaucracy is minimum, whereas in the latter it is at its maximum. Wittfogel shows how, in the "agrarian despotisms," power is concentrated in the hands of the Despot, who makes use of different devices (using slaves and eunuchs at the top positions, for instance) for keeping the power of the bureaucracy down. In Prussia, on the contrary, it was in the hands of the bureaucracy that it "was concentrated the de facto power to make the basic political decisions, to determine policy by taking the initiative and managing the king . . ." (Rosenberg, p. 209).

So, we have two basic questions about absolutism. What contributes to it? When is absolutism exercised by bureaucracy?

The first question is, perhaps, the question of modern Political Science, and we can do nothing but to make a brief reference to it here. Wittfogel points to one

factor: the development of huge bureaucratic apparatuses for the construction and maintenance of heavy water works. Bendix points to another: the development of plebiscitarian societies, where the government, acting "in behalf of all," can eliminate the power of other political groups. For Rosenberg, it was the process of consolidation of a stable Prussian state that led to the transformation of a landlord aristocracy into an absolutist ruling group.

The general characteristic of the three situations was the development of a highly bureaucratic apparatus. In the agrarian Empires, bureaucracy permits the concentration of power in the hands of the king, and thus reduces patrimonialism and feudalism. The transformation of landlords into militarists and bureaucrats is the basic phenomenon in absolutist Prussia; in a modern context, the plebiscitarian situation calls for the intervention of the state in all the spheres, and this leads to the growth of the administration and the reduction of functional representation.

These three authors not only point to bureaucratization as a factor of totalitarianism, but also give indications of when growing bureaucratization occurs: in situations of social mobilization, where the state is engaged in the creation or redistribution of a given distribution of resources. This mobilization has as a pre-condition a minimum of surplus that can keep the bureaucrats out of the production for direct consumption, and also that could be reallocated in the society (although this is a weaker condition, since it is always possible to create new resources either by technological improvement or intensive exploitation and expropriation).

So, it seems that bureaucracy is the basic factor of absolutism. But we know that, in many situations, the power of the bureaucracies is much more limited than what we could expect from its size and the actual control of strategic social resources it has. How can we explain these differences? Let us keep the amount of governmental power as constant, and discuss its distribution between rulers and bureaucracy.

The first consideration is that bureaucracy, which is an instrument of the ruler's power, tend to become his only instrument of power, and, consequently, the risk of a bureaucratic take-over is high. The reasons why this does not happen more often is explained by these factors, among others:

a) It is difficult for the bureaucracy to legitimate its power. Although the bureaucracy has, in general, the instruments of administration and coercion (if we include the army in it), the normative compliance that all the governments need for keeping the power on the time depends on a kind of customarily or legally elected head of state that only rarely can be a bureaucracy man. Even Prussia, which was an outstanding example of bureaucratic power, had it, as Rosenberg says, only as a de facto situation. This lack of legitimation means, in some degree, a reduction of power.

b) The ruler not only has a rational, traditional or charismatic legitimation as a power figure, but he in general has his own sources of power that are not transferred to the bureaucracy. These sources of power vary according to the situation, and can be the capacity of popular mobilization, a class-solidarity that can be exercised by techniques of non-cooperation (as in the cases of lock-out), etc.

c) Even when the ruler does not have extra-bureaucratic sources of power, he can still play the bureaucracy off against the gentry, or parts of the bureaucracy against others, etc. If a clear ascriptive barrier exists between the ruling class and the bureaucracy, this situation can lead to an extreme instability of government, with palace intrigues and succession of dynasties. This is the situation where the despotic powers of the ruler are at their maximum, and at the same time his control of the situation over time is minimum. But the bureaucracy has little other chances than to cooperate with the change of one member of the ruling stratum by another one.

So, if the bureaucracy tries to seize the power, there are many ways by which the ruler can stop or limitate it. Besides, it is not always that the bureaucracy has this intention. There are two possibilities here. One is when a bureaucrat

tends to take the power for himself, using or not the bureaucratic apparatus as an instrument for it. The other, which we are most interested in, is when he does it qua bureaucrat, as a member of this specific group and its leader.

The first condition, here, is that the bureaucracy has a group consciousness that could lead it to act as a unified body. Weber states that, in modern societies, the power of the bureaucracy is always towering, but also indicates that, "as an instrument for 'societalizing' relations of power, bureaucracy has been and is a power instrument of the first order--for the one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus" (Weber, p. 228). In another passage, he states that "on the whole, the power position of a monarch opposite bureaucratic officials is far stronger than it was in any feudal state or in the 'stereotyped' patrimonial state. This is because of the constant presence of aspirants for promotion, with whom the monarch can easily replace 'inconvenient and independent officials' (ibid., p. 235).

So, the competitiveness of the modern bureaucracy, together with its other elements of impersonalization, tends to reduce its "esprit de corps," and in consequence reduce the political possibilities both of its members and of the institution as a whole. This Weberian theory on the despolitization effect of professionalization has an important impact on the students of Latin American militarism, many of whom sought military professionalization as the solution for the problem. The limitations of this theory were exposed at its maximum when, shortly after the Argentinian "coup" of 1966, the military chiefs congratulated the troops by their demonstration of "professional efficiency" in the overthrow of the civilian government.

The Argentine case, together perhaps with the revolt of the French army against de Gaulle at the time of the "Algérie Française," is the most outstanding example of how the development of a professional body can lead to increasing political participation. This can be explained, perhaps, by the fact that there is a high imbalance between the internal and external prestige of the bureaucrat inside and outside his institution. When the internal prestige is higher, we can expect that his commitment

to his institution will be at a maximum, creating a corporative situation that, in special situations, can lead to political action. The special situations are a real or perceived threat to the corporation, a loss of legitimation of the political ruler, a social or political confrontation that creates a vacuum of power, etc.

The Prussian case is quite different: here the key factor was the social recruitment of the bureaucracy. The transformation of a nobility into an administrative group eliminated their power as landlords, but created a situation that showed to be much stronger in the long run. It is interesting to make a comparison between the Prussian and the professional Latin American armies. For the latter the social recruitment of its members does not have much influence on the political behavior of the institution, since the internal socialization is much more important. But, as far as the corporativistic characteristics develop, tendencies of endo-recruitment increases, and it is likely that a kind of caste situation emerges.

How much, and when, does bureaucracy lead to totalitarianism? This is a matter of definitions first, and definitions are, in this case, a question of cultural patterns. A Scandinavian can consider as a sign of totalitarianism that everybody in Latin America has to bring an identity card issued by the police, but will think as something natural that the same police, in his country, has to be informed about the address of every citizen. The only definition that could be commonly accepted is the maximum definition: totalitarianism is, par excellence, the situation where the major part of the population of a country is subjected to terror.

If we take this definition, the first conclusion is that only big bureaucracies can exercise terror. Absolute regimes, mainly of the more traditional types, are potentially totalitarian, but the limitations of the governmental machinery creates areas where the governmental arm never reaches. This situation can be compensated by the decentralization of power. The local ruler, when not committed with his area by personal or family ties, is the most efficient instrument of totalitarianism. If this is so, we can suggest that absolutism, when effectively exercised through a bureaucratic structure, tends to be less totalitarian than when it is weakened by

bureaucratic patrimonialism. The true kind of decentralization, however, as the feudal model, tends to create personal relationships that preclude terror.

Absolutist regimes tend to be less authoritarian, or rather less totalitarian, because there is a strong subordination of the bureaucratic apparatus to the central power, whether it is the apparatus itself or not, and this situation generates abstract norms that can be a stable frame for the relationships between citizens, or subjects, and government. But, in situations of mobilization, the bureaucratic structure is ready for a sudden emergence of terror. In this sense absolutist regimes, even when they do not exercise terror, create a situation of constant "beggar's democracy," as stated by Wittfogel.

Out of these extreme cases, totalitarianism, as said before, is a matter of cultural differences and ideological values. The concentration of technical expertise in the bureaucracy is, for sure, a reduction of the power decision of other political groups in the society, and a limitation of the individual freedom of the people for exercising their will through their representatives. But this reduction of the power of the political parties, is, in a way, a liberalization from the control of totalitarian parties over the citizens. This tendency can be observed in the evolution of the social democracy in Western Europe. The development of governmental and bureaucratic "technocratization" was parallel to the "embourgeoisement" of the social democratic parties, that lost their characteristic of compulsory and dominating group of pertainment for the working class.

The power of the bureaucracy for promoting development, if the technical qualifications and purposes of doing it are present, is mainly a matter of whether development can be seen as a purely "technical" matter or not. Development is a "technical problem as far as it does not reduce the resources of any main social group, nor deceives their expectations of improvement. When it becomes a political matter, the power of the bureaucracy of promoting development becomes a special case of the question of control of the political power.

IV. - Variable Productivity

There are different ways of looking to the problem of productivity, and some preliminary distinctions are necessary.

First, there is the distinction between productivity and efficiency, where the first refers to the capacity of creating goods and the second with the capacity to carry out commands. The parallel Weber makes between modern bureaucracies and machines is illustrating. It is clear that a machine is not more or less productive, but more or less efficient: the productivity is a quality of the man who operates the machine, and he is more productive, other things being equal, the more efficient his tools are.

This is not a simple scholastic distinction. To think in bureaucracies as machines is proper of the perspective of a laissez-fair state, where the state needs to act efficiently, but does not develop productive activities on its own. To think in terms of productivity means to think of an interventionist state, producing or inducing the production of goods that are considered necessary for the common welfare. So, the legal-rational bureaucracy, of the Weberian type, is the best fitted for efficiency purposes, but is not necessarily so for productivity purposes.

The other distinction is that of productivity as global capacity and productivity as the ratio input/output. This distinction is less important, theoretically, than the former one, although it has also its implications. The first meaning (which we shall call "capacity") is concerned with what bureaucracy represents in terms of growing economic, political and social power of the state, while the second is concerned with the burden of the bureaucratic apparatus to society. (We shall refer to this second meaning simply as "productivity").

The bureaucracy that can better contribute to the ideal of development is concerned mainly with productivity, and not with efficiency; and must be the most productive, both in absolute and relative terms. Which are the conditions that lead to it?

There are many technicalities here that are important, but belong to the specific field of administration. Structures of communication, techniques of documentation, different specialized skills are factors which have to be considered as influencing different levels of productivity. For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that these organizational techniques are easily available, so that any public bureaucracy could incorporate them. There are problems of readaptation, training, and education of personnel, but these problems are also technically manageable, if enough resources exist. The real problematic situation, from a sociological standpoint, is where all the technical and economic resources are present, but the level of productivity is low. How to explain it?

An obvious, though not always evident explanation, is that productivity is not necessarily a predominant goal of the bureaucracy. It is a characteristic of the modern underdeveloped countries that their administrative structure is used mainly as a channel of upward mobility, and this regardless of the functional needs of administration. The control the government has of this important source of prestige is too important to be given to some technical reasoning. The fact that some foreign experts are called for rationalizing the administration, or even that some commissions or other types of bodies are created for this purpose does not mean that the main, political use of the bureaucracy has been abandoned. This mixture of non-productive and productive objectives is the characteristic of what F. Riggs calls "sala" bureaucracy, which is characterized both by a size that is completely out of proportion to its more manifest functions, and by being very unproductive.

The prestige function of the bureaucratic structures is mainly a characteristic of modernizing states, but other non-production functions exist in the more "old" underdeveloped societies, e.g., Latin America. In this context a peculiar manifestation of the spoils system appears. As in the classical spoils system, public functions are distributed as prebendas among political clients. But the development of the civil servants as a pressure group very often leads to the introduction of very

rigid norms and regulations that impede the dismissal of the clients of the former party in office. The consequence is that new clients are added to the old ones, the size of the bureaucracy is always bigger, and no productivity is possible.

In this situation, the efforts of some central body to improve rationalization and productivity can only be oriented towards the creation of norms and regulations that, in the last analysis, only increase the heavy-weightedness of the public bureaucracies. In situations where it is impossible, by political reasons, to dissolve the old bureaucratic structure and create a new one that could be oriented towards productivity from the very beginning, duplication seems to be the best solution. This was adopted in Brazil during the Kubitschek period, with the development of state-owned enterprises outside the norms, regulations and difficulties of the public administration, and these enterprises, combined or not with private capital, were a basic element for the success of Kubitschek's Target Program. In general, we would say that it is almost impossible to transform a prestige or clientelistic oriented bureaucracy into a productive one without transformations that are equivalent to real revolutions.

But why are people more interested in prestige, or jobs, than in productivity? A simple answer is that productivity is a long-term project, and very abstract indeed, whereas a position of prestige inside the public administration is something very immediate and concrete. Some psychological explanations are very often brought to the discussion of this point, as does Lucian Pye, for instance. Without going into the details of his hypothesis, we can simply say that the fact that cultures that have very little in common--like Burma, the Philippines and Latin America--show the same patterns of bureaucratic behavior, is enough to invalidate the power explanation of this kind of psychological theories. Less trivial, although less sophisticated, is Mannoni's theory about the dependence complex. Although we could not evaluate the quality of his theory from a psychoanalytic standpoint (and we suspect it is not very good), he points to what could be a very general trait of

the human personality which could have much more relevance than the search for differential traits of national character.

The study Crozier makes of the French "Industrial Monopoly" throws some more light onto the problem. This Industrial Monopoly is a state enterprise, and thus an ideal place for studying problems of productivity, which are much more difficult to ascertain when there is no purpose of a specific product as the output. But what Crozier says, from the very beginning, is that productivity in terms of output per capita, or relation input/output, is only one and not necessarily the most important goal of the Monopoly. The cost of the product is not very important: there is no competition, and besides the bigger part of it are taxes. This lack of concern with productivity is indeed a common characteristic of state enterprises, since they seldom enter in the free market competition. We shall come back to this point later on.

That there is not much concern about productivity does not mean, of course, that there is no concern with production, and actually production, in terms of capacity, is one of the main goals of the monopoly. Another goal is to provide jobs and security for some specially under-privileged group, i.e., widows or war victims. In general, the second goal of the bureaucracy is to provide income and security for its workers and functionaries regardless of their productivity. This is secured, first, by the fact that productivity is really not important; secondly, by the group cohesion and strength that exists at each level of the organization, which leads, in addition, to limitations in the power of the management, an over-all rigidity of patterns of behavior and further limitations of productivity.

In this sense the Industrial Monopoly, in spite of the very rational context which is the French civil service, has also its clientelistic components. How to increase productivity in this condition?

The main point of conflict is between the tendencies towards stabilization and routinization and the demands of increasing rationalization. As far as the power of the bureaucratic groups increases, the tendencies toward routinization also increases

and the only solution to this problem seems to be continuous shakings of the bureaucratic structure. So, the same as Bendix, who shows how a state of continuous emergency is necessary for the good functioning of the administration in East Germany, or as Schurmann, who shows the conflicts between the routinization tendencies and the productivity demands of the political leadership in China, Crozier indicates that only through a succession of crises can public bureaucracies move towards high levels of productivity.

Routinization and stability leads to ritualism, which is a characteristic of the Weberian type of bureaucracy. If the parallel between modern bureaucracies and machines is acceptable, in terms of efficiency, then we could conclude that the productivity of public bureaucracies can be very high if they are already organized in a rational way, by extra-bureaucratic forces. At the stage of high organization and rationality, the lack of concern with costs problems can lead to experiments, scientific research of a non-applied nature, and this is a decisive advantage of public organization above private ones, in terms of large-run productivity.

Rationality in terms of cost and participation in the market competition are not necessary conditions to productivity, then. The importance of the calculus of costs, as it is becoming evident now with the Liberman's tendency in the Soviet Union, is that this is perhaps the only way of creating a general system of evaluation and accountability. The stimulus of the market can be substituted by other kinds of social gratifications, in terms of self-fulfillment, security, patriotism, etc.

Public bureaucracies are part of the establishment, and, as such, they are a factor of stability. Since development, in terms of increasing production and productivity in a society, is mainly a political process, the general conclusion is that productivity of public bureaucracies cannot be increased through continuous internal developments: it demands external interferences, mainly of a political kind.

V. - Variable organizational forms and authority

There is a myriad of dimensions by which organizational forms and authority can be studied, even if we are limited to the problems of power and productivity. In this discussion, that has to be short, we will consider organizational authority in terms of types of authority, and forms in terms of the bases of solidarity and integration of the bureaucratic organization. A typology of public bureaucracies can be derived from the political characteristics of the society, since bureaucracies are the main instrument through which policies are carried out. We can think on governments in terms of their stability and in terms of their political aims, and this gives us the following typology:

	<u>Government Stability</u>	
	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
<u>Government aims:</u>		
<u>Power</u> <u>Consolidation</u>	mobilization bureaucracies	-----
<u>Power</u> <u>Maintenance</u>	"sala" bureaucracies	status bureaucracy
<u>Welfare</u> <u>State</u>	-----	rational productivity bureaucracy.

These four types of bureaucracy are defined, exactly, in terms of their organizational forms and authority, as these concepts are taken here.

Mobilization bureaucracies are endowed with a charismatic type of authority, and are structured around what Durkheim calls "solidarite mecanique," which is a kind of solidarity all the members of the institution or group. This kind of solidarity, to Durkheim, is proper of the primitive societies, and the concept of "solidarite mecanique" has to do with other concepts like "agraria," "folk" cultures, "gemeinschaft," etc. These are relations of a primary character, that can only occur in situations where the number of persons in the inter-action is limited, the degree of differentiation of the social structure is low and the involvement of the individual in this system is high.

So, only in special conditions mechanical solidarity appears in modern large-size institutions, where the complexity is high, and the involvement of the different actors tend to be lower than in the more primitive situations. The term "mobilization" refers exactly to this kind of situation, when all the members of a given institution are mobilized to collective action by a collective movement which contains ideological and value components that integrate and surpass the objective definitions of each function. The brilliant study Schurmann makes of "The Thought of Mao-Tse-Tung," in China, is a demonstration of how this mobilization process operates.

Mobilization systems demand charismatic leadership, or charismatic authority. The case here is different from the situation of public bureaucracies under charismatic political leadership, at the head of state level. In the last case, charismatic leadership is compatible, and sometimes supposes a rational or status bureaucracy based on legal authority. In the former, however, charisma is necessary inside the organization structure, and the ideal situation of mobilization institutions is that there is a certain amount of charisma at each authority level. Two examples of this kind of authority structure are common, the army and the Church. But in both cases normal and stable situations tend to substitute charismatic leadership by legal leadership, generally based upon seniority. Only in situations of conflict, as in cases of war or religious conflicts (and religious warfare is the normal state of religious sects) is the charismatic authority fully in action. The conclusion is that mobilization bureaucracies are a very unstable phenomenon, that tend to change its character when power consolidation is achieved by the government.

"Sala" bureaucracies are well studied by Riggs, and only some references will be made to them here. They arise in situations where the government is threatened in its position, but, instead of developing a fight for its consolidation, is oriented towards political concessions to actual or potential adversaries, in a

policy of cooptation. In this situation the government does not have full control of the bureaucracy, which is used only for political maintenance purposes. The authority, in this case, tends to be exercised in a purely formalistic way, and the integration of the system is based on relations of familism, clientelism and other kinds of almost-patrimonial use of the bureaucratic apparatus.

If a high level of stability is achieved in this situation, it is very likely that bureaucracy develops into the status type. The members of bureaucracy develop solidarity based on their status, general rules are developed for the guarantee of the equal rights of the peer groups, and the amplitude and limits of authority are explicitly regulated. There is a conjunction, in this case, of the interests of the rulers and the bureaucracy, and legal forms of authority emerge. The integration of the institution is based on status solidarity of the different bureaucratic strata, or of the whole bureaucracy as an institution. As discussed before, this status solidarity can be originated either by the special kind of recruitment of the civil servants or by the socialization provided by the institution itself.

Rational bureaucracy, oriented towards productivity, is a characteristic of modern developed societies. The leadership is based upon expertise, having thus a rational character, while the principle of solidarity is the functional differentiation--"solidarite organique," according to Durkheim's terminology. The problem of the evolution of the "sala" or "status" type into a rational one, through a mobilization stage or not, is one of the main open questions in the sociology of development, and no attempt will be made to answer it here.

It is interesting to observe, as the last remark of this section, that it seems to exist some indications of circularity, the rational-productivity type having some common traits with the charismatic, or mobilization one. In both types the authority is based upon the personal characteristics of the superior, in terms of charisma or expertise. In both the involvement of the personnel, or at least its commitment with the general values of the organization, tends to be high, either

in terms of ideology or in terms of a general acceptance of productivity as a desirable end. We could speculate about which kind of status system will develop from the modern semi-mobilized rational bureaucracy. But this, as this circularity hypothesis in itself, is already too much of speculation.

The following table summarizes the previous discussion:

<u>Bureaucracy Types</u>				
	<u>Mobilization</u>	<u>Style</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Rational</u>
<u>Authority:</u>	charismatic	formalist	legal	rational
<u>Form:</u>	"solidarite mecanique"	familism, clientelism	status solidarity	"solidarite organique"
<u>Examples:</u>	Mao's China, N'Kruma's Ghana	Brazil, Philippines	Imperial Prussia, Crozier's France	Modern Scandinavia.

VI. - Variable Behavior

Variable behavior is the most general problem of our four, and also the most difficult to handle, exactly, perhaps, because of its generality. If we compare with the problem of power, we notice that this is a much more concrete phenomenon that can be more easily located in concrete and historical situations. But, unless we accept the "national character" orientation, it is practically impossible to look for societal determinants of variable behavior in general.

This difficulty appears when, for instance, we try to use Parson's pattern variables in cross-cultural analysis. We doubt that a given culture could be characterized as more particularistic, diffuse or collective oriented than others. These are orientations of action that are given in specific inter-action situations, and we believe that to think that it is the orientation that determines the nature of the inter-action, and not the contrary, is misleading and anti-sociological as a perspective.

The best way for handling the problem is to consider behavior patterns as intervening variables between structural situations and outcomes in terms of power and productivity. We have done it in the discussion of variable power and productivity, in many instances. So, regarding power, we discussed when the civil servant develop strong identifications with his institution, as a result of prestige imbalances between the internal and external organizational statuses. The same status reasoning was used for the discussion of productivity. And the behavior impact in organizational forms was discussed as contributing to the four types of bureaucracies we suggested before.

What we shall do here is, using Crozier's study of the French Industrial Monopoly, try to go more into the detail of the structural determinants of behavior. Behavior, here, is basically the strategy of the individuals regarding the institution they belong to, and can be thought in terms of commitment. Presthus' typology, in terms of upward mobiles, indifferents and ambivalents; Turaine's distinction among "retreat," "conflict" and "participation;" Merton's well known typology of anomie are alternative ways of dealing with the same problem.

From the discussion Crozier makes of the power relationships at the management level interesting insights can be obtained regarding the attitudes of the role-players towards the monopoly.

The status of a member of the monopoly is described as depending upon his formal position in the hierarchy, his seniority and the technical relevance of his role to the performance of the production tasks. Besides, the social origin of the servant has also an impact on his behavior. It is possible to see that, for the four managerial roles, only the director has high formal status, only the assistant director has low seniority, and only the technical engineer is really important for the production, from a technical point of view. The following tables gives the pictures of the status configurations:

	<u>Director</u>	<u>Assistant Director</u>	<u>Technical Engineer</u>	<u>Comptroller</u>
<u>Formal Status:</u>	High	Low	Low	Low
<u>Seniority</u>	High	Low	High	High
<u>Social Origin (recruitment)</u>	High	High	Low	Low
<u>Functional relevance</u>	Low	Low	High	Low

The behavior patterns follow easily from the table.

The director has all the high positions, except one: a real important function in the enterprise. His behavior, in consequence, can be either to neglect the functional activities, or to try to improve its relevance. What seems to determine his choice is the bearing his two sources of status, intra- and extra-organization, can have upon each other. If the director lives in a small town, his social prestige as Director is much higher than the benefits he could obtain by a higher participation in the enterprise. His group of reference is not his colleagues graduated from the Polytechnique, but the town, and here he is well off. He will not be bothered by his little activity as an engineer, and will in general disregard his functional activities. On the other hand, if he lives in Paris and has the other graduate engineers as his peer group, his status among them will be lower than his intra-organizational role as director. This will lead him to a higher participation in the enterprise, as the milieu where he gets more satisfaction, as well as the instrument he has of rising his external prestige.

The assistant director is low in everything, except external status: he too is a graduate from the Polytechnique. His behavior, in consequence, is very clear-cut: he quits the organization as fast as he feels that he can move easily outside it. On the other hand, the comptroller, that has nothing but seniority, performs his functions in a ritualistic way, is not interested in quitting the organization nor in changing it.

The role of the technical engineer is perhaps the more interesting. He is high in seniority and functional relevance, and low in formal status and external recognition. The conclusion is that his commitment with the enterprise is high, and it is of a conflictive kind. He will be the more interested in the production tasks, although he will resist any change that could reallocate the technical power he has. He will dispute the formal authority of the director on the grounds that he has his status on a purely ascriptive basis, without merit. In general, he will be the source of a manifestation of latent source of struggle for power inside the organization.

What is remarkable is that these attitudes, that follow logically from the status-configuration patterns, correspond very well to what was found empirically. The structure of the organization, and the distribution of status, is something that can be explained in historical grounds, or by some kind of "french-ness" factor. But, once the structure is given, the behavior follows necessarily.

The main problem with this structural approach is that it implies a model of rationality of the actors that is not necessarily the only possible model. For instance, for the Human Relations school there is a kind of "feelings" logic that is paramount at the informal level of the organization; a psychanalytic approach will be close to some kind of "logic of the unconscious." The economics approach will look for a rationality in terms of profit. And so on.

Our suggestion is that all models coexist, but prevail according to the kind of interaction setting. So, we would expect a "logic of the unconscious" in a love interaction, a logic of profit in an economic transaction, and a logic of status inside an institution, as the prevailing determinants of behavior. In general, besides and in addition to cultural and personality determinants, any given inter-action system creates its own logic and the patterns of response to it. So, when Bendix studies the problems derived from the relations of work and

authority in industry, his main thesis is that, when a few command and many obey, it creates a given set of problems that are common to all production organizations, regardless of the cultural contexts. It is the participation of the state in the conflicts in the enterprises that makes for Bendix, all the differences.

Which kinds of behavior contribute most to productivity? Those derived from high levels of commitment, in general; in situations where the organization is fully developed, when the commitment is both with the explicit goals and with the implicit norms and informal groups inside the organization. In situations where the level of development of the organization is low, the more productive person is one who has a high commitment to the organization as an interaction system, but not with its present situation and definition of goals.

We shall leave the question of behavior at this level of generality.

VIII. - Conclusions: Unanswered Questions.

Many questions, implicit or explicitly formulated during the seminar, are not discussed here. We did not discuss the problems of power as a function of development, with the model of free-floating resources and publicness of issues. The same happened with productivity, where the stages of administrative development were not analysed. The last two questions, authority and forms and behavior, have still more empty spaces, even in terms of the bibliography, which was not fully referred to. The main unanswered question is, perhaps, the explanation of the changes of bureaucratic systems from one type to another, from one level to another of political power and productivity.

There are some explanations for these shortcomings, leaving aside the weariness of the end of the quarter and the end of the paper. Our framework was limited, and, although we well know that everything is related to anything, some limitations had to be made, and we decided for the aspects we knew better, which

were more directly linked with our framework and could also have some originality regarding what was said in the seminar. Finally, As we pointed out before, the last two questions are too general to admit a deeper discussion within our limitations of space and time, and this appeared in the seminar itself, where the last two questions received much less elaboration than the first two.

Or perhaps are there, after all, nothing but personal shortcomings?
Perhaps, in another paper...

Berkeley, June, 1967.

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